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Internet domains come in all sorts of combinations. From creating a
website called Business.com to Dotcom.com, the possibilities are somewhat
endless. This customizable feature attracts people and companies to create
domains to fit their commercial needs, enabling them to match a company’s
name, product, or service to the domain. A website domain is comprised of a
top-level domain (TLD) such as “.com,” as well as a second-level domain
(SLD) such as art—where the most customization occurs.1 As the Internet
grew, so did the popularity of the “generic domain name,” a domain with a
generic SLD like art. By choosing a generic domain to represent a company,
that company can hit the Internet jackpot.2 But the price for a generic domain
name can cost a small fortune.3 Generic domains are easier to find and re-
member, helping to attract unintended consumers. The right domain name
can reduce the cost of advertising because if a consumer is searching for a
common product, they will quickly be linked to sites where the domain name
is the exact product the consumer is looking for.4 Thus, generic domains have
turned into the most coveted virtual real estate.5 But this popularity creates
tension with trademark law. While companies want to be easily found on the
Internet, they also want to protect themselves from competitors. The Su-
preme Court attempted to resolve this conflict in the groundbreaking case of
United States Patent & Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.6
Part II of this Casenote discusses the background of trademark law in
order to establish the relevant and underlying principles. Part III addresses
the history of generic domain cases and how they were treated at all levels of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and judicial system.
Part IV dissects the Booking.com case, its road to the Supreme Court, and its
outcome. Part V explains why the ruling is in accordance with the law and
why it is important to further trademark principles. Finally, Part VI addresses
* Samantha Favela is a second-year law student at SMU Dedman School of Law
with Journalism and Advertising degrees from the University of Texas at
Austin.
1. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move over In-
herently Distinctive Trademarks—the E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain
Names Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 956 n.128 (2001).
2. Id. at 953–54.
3. Id. at 938.
4. Id. at 954.
5. Id. at 955.
6. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2302 (2020).
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the implications this ruling has for the future and the important questions that
arise.
II. BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW
Trademark law protects words, phrases, symbols, or designs that iden-
tify the source of goods or service of one party that distinguishes them from
another.7 Trademark law is a longstanding concept that is fundamentally
grounded in the idea that a mark identifies the maker.8 But this concept has
evolved into more modern functions such as embodying a company’s invest-
ment, reducing the costs for consumers to search and decide on products,
increasing efficiency, and providing a sense of protection.9 Essentially, a
trademark functions not only to identify the source of the good or service but
also as an advertising vehicle.10
Trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act, which creates a national
system for registering trademarks as well as setting out protections for cur-
rent trademark owners.11 A trademark is protectable even if it is not federally
registered.12 However, federally registering a mark offers certain advantages,
such as establishing the registrant as the owner of the mark, granting exclu-
sive use in commerce, and providing nationwide constructive notice of these
rights.13 In order to register a mark, the owner of a mark must complete a
federal registration application through the USPTO, and the mark is then
evaluated by a trademark attorney to determine if it is eligible for trademark
protection.14 If the application is rejected, an applicant can appeal to the
Trademark and Trial Appeal Board (TTAB), and if dissatisfied with the
TTAB decision, the applicant can appeal through the traditional court
system.15
Trademarks are characterized by their distinctiveness, and this distinc-
tiveness exists on a spectrum.16 On one end are generic terms which are not
7. Judy E. Zelin, Trademarks, Etc., 70 TEX. JUR. 3D § 7, Westlaw (Apr. 2021 ed.).
8. JAMES E. HAWES, TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PRACTICE § 1:2 (Mar. 2021 ed.).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2302; see also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n (1946).
12. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2302.
13. HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:3.
14. GARY D. KRUGMAN, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2:1 (2020–2021 ed.).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1070, 1071 (2011).
16. HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:6.
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afforded any protection and cannot be trademarked.17 Generic terms refer to
the genus of a particular product or service or, stated differently, are terms
that are commonly used as the name or description of a kind of good, such as
thermos.18 The idea of non-registrable trademark stems from the notion that
affording protection to generic terms would promote anti-competitive behav-
ior,19 since the term is incapable of identifying a single source.20 In order for
a mark to be established as a valid trademark as compared to a generic mark,
the owner of the mark “must show that the primary significance of the term
in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.”21
Additionally, in an important Supreme Court case further defining the param-
eters of what constitutes a generic trademark, the Court ruled in Goodyear
Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co. that the combination of a generic term and
“company” cannot be trademarked.22 On the opposite side of the spectrum
are arbitrary and fanciful marks.23 These are the strongest types of trade-
marks and are entitled to protection because they are considered inherently
distinct.24 Here, the words are used in arbitrary or fanciful ways, meaning
these marks have no association with the goods or services they designate.25
Examples include “KODAK” for photography-related products or “Apple”
for computers.26 In between the two are descriptive marks and suggestive
marks.27 Descriptive marks are one step above generic, and these are words
that describe the quality, function, characteristic, or ingredient of the good or
service.28 The strength and the ability to register a descriptive mark depends
on how distinctive it is of the goods or services it is associated with, but
generally descriptive marks are considered weak marks.29 An example would
be “Yellow Pages” for the telephone directory.30 In order for a descriptive
17. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 901 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d,
915 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2019), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct.
187 (2020).
18. CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION: LANHAM ACT 43(a) § 3:3 (2020).
19. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
20. KRUGMAN, supra note 14, § 2:77.
21. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 205 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
22. Goodyear Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 602–03 (1888).
23. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
24. Id.
25. HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:6.
26. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
27. HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:6.
28. Id.
29. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
30. Id.
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mark to be trademarked, it must have acquired a secondary meaning.31 Sec-
ondary meaning is when the descriptive mark is associated in the minds of
consumers with that particular good or service or when it identifies a particu-
lar producer.32 Only descriptive marks require secondary meaning in order to
be protected.33 Suggestive marks are one step below arbitrary and fanciful,
and these marks are words that convey the impression of goods or services
but still require imagination to associate it with the good or service.34 “Cop-
pertone” for sunscreen is an example of a suggestive mark as it implies with-
out describing a certain characteristic of the sunscreen.35
Federal registration of a mark does not create a complete ban on the use
of the protectable trademark in commerce.36 Specifically, with descriptive
marks, certain doctrines are available to guard against anti-competitiveness
and allow for good faith use.37 Because trademark infringement is the unau-
thorized use of a mark in a way that is likely to cause confusion, deception,
or mistake about a good or service,38 a competitor can use someone else’s
protectable mark unless it will likely cause confusion.39 Even if it does gener-
ate some confusion, it may not be infringement.40 Classic fair use allows an
entity to use someone else’s trademark to refer to their own product or ser-
vice.41 This allows for some confusion in the interest of free competition.42
III. PRIOR TREATMENT OF “.COM” CASES
The USPTO has been inconsistent with how it handles the eligibility of
a generic domain trademark, allowing some names to be trademarked and not
allowing others.43 For example, Art.com and Dating.com have achieved fed-
eral registration.44 However, consistently on appeal, generic domain cases
31. Zelin, supra note 7, § 7.
32. Id.
33. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
34. HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:6.
35. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 901.
36. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2020).
37. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 911–12.
38. About Trademark Infringement, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-
trademark-infringement (last visited July 5, 2021).
39. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307.
40. Id. at 2307–08.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2308.
43. See id. at 2305; see In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d. 1300, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
44. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305.
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have been decided in favor of no eligibility due to its generic nature.45 For
example, in In re Hotels.com, L.P., “Hotels.com” was generic since the addi-
tion of “.com” simply shows Internet commerce and does not convert the
generic term into a brand name.46 Because there was not enough evidence to
show that Hotels.com had become distinct, it was not trademarkable.47 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit similarly held in In re
Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. that “Lawyers.com” could not be trademarked
due to the mark being understood to refer to the genus of services it was
promoting and not the specific company itself.48 The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that “Advertise.com” was a generic term as applied to Internet adver-
tising services.49 Consequently, it was not trademarkable because adding
“.com” to a generic term simply indicates a commercial entity and is not
sufficient to make it distinct.50 The commonality of these cases demonstrate
that “.com” is a generic term that cannot be afforded protection as a regis-
tered mark in combination with another generic SLD. It was not until the
district court in Booking.com that the view began to shift, eventually creating
a circuit split that required the Supreme Court to resolve.51
IV. BOOKING.COM BREAKING PRECEDENT
Because of its treatment in both the district court and court of appeals,
the Booking.com case was an outlier. Although the USPTO rejected “Book-
ing.com” as a protectable trademark four times, both the district court for the
Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of Book-
ing.com, breaking from other courts’ holdings and creating a split among
itself and the Ninth and Federal Circuit.52
Booking.com, a travel booking website, filed four applications through
the USPTO to trademark their name, which included a standard character
version and three stylized versions of the mark.53 The mark for each applica-
tion was rejected because it was merely descriptive, had no secondary mean-
45. See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d at 1306.
46. Id. at 1304.
47. Id. at 1306.
48. In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
49. Advertise.Com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 981–82 (9th Cir.
2010).
50. Id.
51. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 923 (E.D. Va. 2017).
52. See Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 188 (4th Cir. 2019), aff’d,
140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 187 (2020); Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d
at 923.
53. Paul J. Reilly & Smitha Mathews, What to do with a Descriptive Mark? Book-
ing.com & the PTO, ST. B. TEX. 1, 3 (2020).
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ing, and was generic as to reservation services.54 After reconsiderations were
denied, Booking.com appealed to the TTAB, consolidating the four applica-
tions.55 Booking.com’s principal argument at this stage focused on distinc-
tiveness, maintaining that the mark was not generic but rather had acquired
the secondary meaning required to be registered.56 The company argued that
“Booking” and “.com” should not be treated as independent terms but should
be treated in its entirety.57 Contrarily, the Trademark Office argued a per se
rule that adding “.com” to a generic term such as booking always makes the
mark generic.58 This became the main argument as the case progressed.59 The
TTAB upheld the refusal to register “Booking.com” as a trademark because
it is generic as applied to the company’s services and the mark is merely
descriptive with no showing of it having acquired distinctiveness.60
After exhausting its options at the USPTO, Booking.com took the case
to federal district court in the Eastern District of Virginia.61 The case turned
on where “Booking.com” fell on the distinctiveness spectrum.62 Because the
issue focused on distinctiveness, Booking.com was allowed to present evi-
dence that consumers did not perceive Booking.com as a generic term for a
service.63 Specifically, the court highlighted a Teflon survey revealing that
nearly 75% of the respondents identified “Booking.com” as a brand name.64
The district court used the Fourth Circuit’s three-step test for genericness: (1)
determine the relevant class of product or service to which the mark is used;
(2) determine the relevant purchasing public of the relevant class of product
or service; and (3) determine whether the primary significance of the mark to
the relevant public is to identify the class of product or service to which the
mark relates.65 The district court first determined the relevant class broadly as
“making hotel reservations for others.”66 Secondly, the court identified con-
sumers “who use travel, tour, and hotel reservation services” as the relevant
purchasing public.67 The decision turned on the third step, and while the dis-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Reilly & Mathews, supra note 53, at 4.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (E.D. Va. 2017).
63. Id. at 915.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 902.
66. Id. at 903.
67. Id.
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trict court indicated the mark should be considered in its entirety, it was not
precluded from considering the meaning of individual words to determine the
meaning of the entire mark.68 The district court decided to break from Fed-
eral Circuit precedent in holding that “.com” when combined with a SLD,
such as Booking.com, is generally a descriptive mark that is protectable upon
showing it has acquired distinctiveness.69
Unhappy with the decision, the USPTO appealed the district court’s de-
termination that “Booking.com” is not generic.70 The Fourth Circuit nar-
rowed down the dispute to the third step of the generic test: the public’s
understanding of what the term “Booking.com” references.71 The Fourth Cir-
cuit first clarified that the USPTO bore the burden of proving that a mark is
generic,72 and the mark in question should be considered as a whole when
determining its validity.73 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found agreed with the
district court in that the USPTO failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the
relevant public understood “Booking.com,” taken as a whole, to refer to gen-
eral online hotel reservation services instead of Booking.com the company.74
Because the USPTO lacked any evidence that “Booking.com” was generic
and Booking.com introduced survey evidence to support its distinctiveness
argument, the district court was correct when it found “the evidence weighed
in favor of Booking.com to be non-generic.”75 The Fourth Circuit also re-
jected the USPTO’s per se rule based on the decision in Goodyear.76 The
addition of a TLD like “.com” to a generic SLD like “booking” is not neces-
sarily generic.77 However, the court rejected the district court’s reasoning that
“.com” has source identifying significance when added to a domain name
such as “booking.”78 The inquiry instead centered on whether the public un-
derstood the term as a whole to refer to the source.79 Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit held that adding “.com” to a SLD can result in a descriptive mark if it
68. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 904.
69. See id. at 923.
70. See Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2019), aff’d,
140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 187 (2020).
71. Id. at 181.
72. Id. at 179–80.
73. Id. at 181 (citing Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc., 240 F.3d
251, 254 (4th Cir. 2001)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 181–82.
76. Booking.com, 915 F.3d at 184.
77. Id. at 181.
78. Id. at 185.
79. Id.
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can be shown that the mark’s primary significance to the relevant public is
the source.80
The USPTO appealed once again.81 The Supreme Court declined to
adopt the per se rule that all generic domain marks are generic and are not
protectable.82 Instead, the Court established that consumer perception is the
deciding factor in these situations.83 In order for the mark to be deemed non-
generic, it must identify the source and not the class.84 Therefore, because
“Booking.com” is not generic to consumers, it is not a generic mark.85 The
Court importantly distinguished Goodyear, holding that a TLD is unlike a
company designation because a TLD directs consumers to a single, specific
website, unlike a company designation.86 This comparison was faulty, ac-
cording to the Court, since domain names themselves can only be occupied
by one entity at a time.87 Further, the Court made clear that this ruling would
not allow for monopolies and “undue control” because other fundamental
trademark laws still apply such as likelihood of confusion and classic fair
use.88
V. BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME
Although this is a controversial decision by the Supreme Court, it is
correct for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court decided against a strict
per se rule and therefore allowed for a case-by-case analysis.89 This is impor-
tant because a case-by-case analysis reveals the USPTO’s current and re-
quired format.90 A trademark application is examined individually when
determining if it can be registered due to the nuances of the mark itself.91 It is
difficult to look at a mark in a vacuum since certain inquiries are necessary to
determine how distinct a mark is, what product or service the mark identifies,
80. Id. at 186.
81. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2020).
82. See id. at 2301.
83. Id. at 2307.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 2305.
86. See id. at 2305–06.
87. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2306.
88. See id. at 2307–08.
89. See id. at 2301.
90. See John Strand & Amanda Slade, Supreme Court’s Booking.com Ruling Sig-
nals Uptick in Registration of “Generic.com” Marks, IPWATCHDOG (July 5,
2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/07/05/supreme-courts-booking-com-
ruling-signals-uptick-registration-generic-com-marks/id=123072/.
91. See In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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what industry the product or service is in, and if the mark is used in com-
merce.92 The same inquiries apply to marks concerning domain names.93
Secondly, and similarly, the Supreme Court’s holding follows the heart
of the Lanham Act.94 Trademark law is intended to reflect and protect con-
sumer perceptions,95 and this ruling does just that.96 Trademark eligibility for
generic marks turns on whether consumers associate the mark with a particu-
lar product or entity rather than the whole genus.97 It follows that the same
rules would apply to determining whether a domain name is really generic.98
Further, the Lanham Act incentivizes brand investment by assuring that the
producer of a good or service, and not an imitating competitor, will gain the
financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product or
service.99 It goes against the Lanham Act to have a ruling that prevents a
company to profit off of their investment to make their brand distinct.100
Therefore, per se rules do not allow for this consumer perception inquiry and
are not compatible with trademark law’s goals.101
Thirdly, this ruling is still subject to other trademark limitations such as
classic fair use and the likelihood of confusion.102 A critique of allowing
“generic.com” marks to be trademarked is that this will promote anti-compet-
itiveness.103 However, these fundamental trademark doctrines combat this
fear because they ensure that competitors are free to use the generic marks in
a non-trademark manner as long as it does not cause consumer confusion.104
This ruling does not give generic domain marks a free pass.105 Just as de-
scriptive trademarks are considered inherently weak, generic domain marks
will be viewed the same.106 Booking.com even admitted that registration of
92. See HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:11.
93. See In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d at 1342.
94. See Strand & Slade, supra note 90; see also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n (1946).
95. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (E.D. Va. 2017).
96. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2305 (2020).
97. See Matal, 278 F. Supp. at 902.
98. See id. at 905–06.
99. Id. at 900 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64
(1995)).
100. See id.
101. See Strand & Slade, supra note 90.
102. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2020).
103. Id. at 2314 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 2307 (majority opinion).
105. See id.
106. See id.
108 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXIV
its mark would not prevent others from using “booking” to describe their
services.107 Further, the Supreme Court’s reasoning does not entirely break
from precedent.108 In In re Dial-a-Mattress, the mark “1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-
S” was found protectable because, even though area codes have no source
identifying significance by themselves and the term “mattress” was generic,
the combination of an area code and a generic term was deemed source-
identifying, making it a descriptive term.109 The district court in the Book-
ing.com case relied on In re Dial-a-Mattress in its ruling, and the current
Supreme Court reasoning tracks it perfectly.110 A TLD is just like an area
code; it does not have any source identifying significance by itself and, when
combined with a SLD, indicates a domain name which is unique, just like a
telephone number.111 The combination of a generic SLD and a TLD signals
that services relating to the generic SLD are available by accessing the do-
main name, thus making it a descriptive term.112
Finally, the ruling keeps up with the times and changing landscape of
technology. As the Court mentioned in the opinion, domain names are a
unique source identifier and in themselves can only identify one entity, com-
pany, or person.113 No two entities can occupy a single domain at the same
time. If the Court completely ignored this significant factor, it would have
ignored the key characteristic of domain names. In doing so, the Court would
have limited the availability of a whole sector of companies that use their
trademarks to highlight their Internet connection.
If the Court had adopted a per se rule prohibiting the registrability of
generic.com trademarks, the outcome would have certainly created stricter
precedent with hindering effects. Adopting a per se rule would have provided
generic.com marks no protection at all.114 Generic.com marks would not be
eligible for federal registration and all the advantages associated with it re-
gardless of whether they are distinctive in the eyes of consumers.115 Although
a mark does not need to be registered, certain benefits like prima facie evi-
dence of validity and ownership, enhanced remedies, or the right to bring a
federal cause of action would not be afforded to these mark owners.116 Ulti-
mately, this could have a deterring effect on online businesses and competi-
107. Id. at 2308.
108. See In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
109. Id.
110. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 909 (E.D. Va. 2017).
111. Id.
112. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2306.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2305.
115. Id.
116. HAWES, supra note 8, § 1:10.
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tion, something the Lanham Act has specifically tried to avoid.117
Establishing a per se rule does not completely bar an entity from protecting
their mark.118 The unfair-competition law can prevent competitors from pass-
ing off their services as another trademark owner’s, but, as the Court stated,
federal trademark registration would offer generic.com mark owners the
greater protection.119 Lastly, having a per se rule would have created clearer
precedent and made it easier for courts and practitioners to determine trade-
mark eligibility.120 However, the clearer precedent may come at a cost.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The allowance of generic domain trademarks and the case-by-case anal-
ysis creates certain implications for the future, especially for practitioners
and for future Internet ideas. Lawyers and business owners will now have to
treat generic domain marks just like descriptive trademarks.121 Generic do-
main marks will be afforded the same protections, and the same fundamental
trademark doctrines apply if in the eyes of consumers the mark identifies the
source.122 Using a generic domain mark in a unique font or stylization to set a
website and name apart will be important in order to establish the mark as a
source identifier in the eyes of the public.123 Data concerning consumer per-
ception is still necessary and is arguably even more important. There will be
a stronger reliance on surveys for support, examples of consumer and com-
petitor usage, and even dictionaries to prove that the public finds the mark
distinctive and not generic.124 But survey evidence should not be viewed as
conclusive.125 As Justice Sotomayor addressed in her concurrence, a flawed
survey will have little value in determining whether the public views a mark
as generic.126 Therefore, extra emphasis is needed to ensure that the design
and analysis of the surveys or other evidence is valid. Ultimately, not having
a per se rule opens the door for more trademark eligibility, but the reality is
that registering a generic domain mark will be costly.127 It will be difficult to
117. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 901 (E.D. Va. 2017).
118. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2308.
119. Id.
120. See Strand & Slade, supra note 90.
121. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307.
122. Id.
123. Martha Allard, Impact of Supreme Court Trademark Decision in Booking.com
Case, JD SUPRA (July 13, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/impact-of
-supreme-court-trademark-91400/.
124. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Strand & Slade, supra note 90.
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overcome the presumption that it is not registrable. This type of inquiry may
be fact intensive and require substantial documentation, something that might
turn into a cost barrier.128
The Supreme Court’s ruling can also have potential negative impacts on
the future. The dissent warns about the high likelihood that this will create a
monopoly over certain domain names and drive anti-competitiveness.129 Es-
sentially, this ruling allows the trademark of a generic name, breaking from
certain precedent and becoming counter-intuitive of established law.130 Fur-
ther, because of the unique nature of domain names, owners have extra com-
petitive advantages, as was pointed out by Justice Breyer in his dissent.131
Domain owners have automatic exclusivity that is world-wide, and generic
domain names are easier for consumers to find.132 Therefore, an owner of a
generic domain name enjoys these benefits not because of the value of their
goods or services but because they were lucky enough to be the first to obtain
the domain.133 Allowing further registration would confer additional competi-
tive benefits that could hinder competition.134 Additionally, a concern before
courts is the reliability of survey data.135 This decision only heightens the
reliance on survey data since the determination of genericness turns on con-
sumer perception that can only be measured using surveys and other similar
methods.136 As Justice Breyer stated, survey evidence “may be an unreliable
indicator of genericness” since it is possible that a generic term can achieve
an association, but that association does not mean the term becomes non-
generic.137 Further, the TTAB and other courts “have concluded that survey
evidence is generally of little value in separating generic from descriptive
terms.”138 This heightened reliance on survey data makes decision making
and outcome predicting more difficult if the issue relies on a rather unreliable
and subjective factor. Further, it raises a question as to what constitutes an
effective consumer survey, which is something that the Court did not address
and will likely lead to more litigation. Lastly, the Court’s holding provides
128. Id.
129. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2314 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (citing Goodyear Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 602–03
(1888)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2315.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2314.
135. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2313 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2314.
138. Id. at 2313.
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no guidance on how to resolve conflicts in the future.139 For example, it is
unclear whether Booking.com can stop hotel-booking.com from using
“booking.com” in their name.
Finally, this decision raises important questions over the protectability
of other symbols and terms commonly used on the Internet. For example,
USPTO examining attorneys have rejected applications for marks that com-
bine the hashtag symbol and a generic term.140 In the USPTO’s Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure, these types of marks must be refused as
merely descriptive or generic.141 It is unclear if the refusal in this case by the
Supreme Court to adopt a per se rule will affect the USPTO’s position con-
cerning hashtags. Further, it is uncertain how this ruling will extend to other
TLDs such as “.org” or “.net” and how it will extend to other Internet based
symbols such as “@.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Although seemingly controversial, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the
Booking.com case is the best possible outcome. It tracks the purpose of the
Lanham Act while keeping traditional trademark doctrines in mind. While
the concerns for its anti-competitive effects are valid and should be moni-
tored, the outcome of this case must be viewed against the necessity for law
to keep up with the times, especially when it comes to changing technology.
Without this ruling, a whole sector of businesses and people would be ineli-
gible to obtain the benefits of their investment and would be unable to protect
their investment in the same way others are able to. However, this decision is
not necessarily a free-for-all as evidence and support of a mark’s distinctive-
ness is required, and realistically this may be a cost burden to some busi-
nesses. There are still unanswered questions as to how this ruling applies to
other Internet symbols. But one thing is for sure—this ruling has opened the
door for businesses to take advantage of federal registration. Since this deci-
sion, over 200 applications have been filed with the USPTO to register ge-
neric domain marks.142
139. Id. at 2315.
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